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Abstract
We study the political economy of social insurance with votersheterogeneity
on two dimensions: income and risk levels. Individuals vote over the extent
of social insurance, which they can complement on the private market. We
model political competition à la Wittman, with two parties maximizing the
utility of their members. We obtain equilibrium policy di¤erentiation with
the Left party proposing more social insurance than the Right party. The
Right party attracts the less risky and richer individuals, and the Left party
attracts the more risky and poorer individuals. In equilibrium, each party
is tying for winning. Unlike the median voter outcome, our equilibrium out-
come depends on the whole income and risk distribution. Conditional on the
risk distribution, more income inequality does not necessarily lead to higher
demand for social insurance. In fact we nd that more income polarization
leads both parties to propose less social insurance. We also contrast our
political equilibrium with the Rawlsian and utilitarian outcomes. Finally,
we provide in the appendix a rst try at calibrating the model with real
data, using U.S. data from the PSID survey.
Keywords: electoral competition, endogenous parties, Wittman equi-
librium, social insurance, adverse selection.
JEL classication: H23, H50
1 Introduction
The Downsian model of two-party competition over a single dimension pre-
dicts party convergence to the median voters most preferred policy if parties
are motivated solely by winning the election and voters preferences sat-
isfy certain properties (single-peakedness or single-crossing mainly). While
Downs(1951) has inspired a very fruitful literature on spatial competition,
the Downsian model fails to predict the persistent party divergence we ob-
serve. Divergence between party positions is well documented in Alesina
and Rosenthal (1995) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984a,1984b) for the US,
Ho¤erbert and Budge (1992) for the UK and Ho¤erbert and Klingemann
(1990) for Germany. Also, Mac Donald et al. (1991) show that Western Eu-
ropean political parties exhibit a tendency toward polarized politics, with
the absence of party position in the center of the distribution of votersideal
points.
In this paper, we use a political economy model that results in party
divergence. Following Wittman, we modify the standard Downsian model
to permit parties to care both about winning elections and about policy.
More precisely, political parties have policy preferences and adopt policy
positions which trade o¤ those preferences against their chance of winning
the election. Unlike many other models that generate centrifugal forces,
this approach generates divergence simply by making realistic assumptions
about the nature of political parties and voters motivations. In particular, as
Roemer (2007) points out, parties are inevitably associated with ideologies
and their members have an inuence in shaping policies.
In his seminal paper, Wittman (1973) assumes that parties are uncer-
tain about the election results when choosing their platform and that they
choose policies in order to maximize expected utility. However, Wittman
(1973) does not explain where the party preferences come from, and makes
no attempt to relate them to voters preferences. Later, Ortuño-Ortín and
Roemer (2000) assume that parties maximize the expected utility of their
members which consist of all the citizens who vote for this party (i.e., who
prefer the policy proposed by this party to the one proposed by the other
party). This was coined the endogenous Wittman equilibrium. Therefore,
what political parties o¤er depends on who they attract and who they at-
tract depends on what they o¤er. This is akin to the idea that citizens vote
with their feet as well as in the voting booth.1In their model, individuals
with di¤erent income endowments vote over a proportional income tax rate
to nance a public good. In stark contrast with the Downsian results, they
obtain that the expected equilibrium tax rate does not coincide with the me-
dian voter outcome. Moreover, the expected tax rate is not increasing with
1See Baron (1993) and Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1997) for similar ideas.
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income inequality (as dened by the di¤erence between mean and median
income levels).
Our objective in this paper is to develop a political model where en-
dogenously formed policy-motivated parties compete over the size of social
insurance when there exists a possibility of substitution with private insur-
ance. The reason for concentrating on social insurance is that it is a central
source of disagreement among political parties in many countries. In our
model, there are two reasons for supporting social insurance. The rst rea-
son is redistribution. Social insurance nancing is usually income-related,
which implies redistribution from rich to poor. Social insurance is also pool-
ing di¤erent risk levels which implies redistribution from low-risk to high-risk
individuals. In contrast, private insurance premia are not related to income
but are related to risk, which eliminates either form of redistribution.
The second reason to support social insurance is e¢ ciency. Contrary to
many papers in the literature which assume perfect private insurance,2 we
introduce adverse selection in the private insurance market. This generates
insurance rationing and provides an e¢ ciency argument for social insurance.
When voting over the level of social insurance, individuals know they
can buy additional insurance on the private market. Following De Donder
and Hindriks (2003), we adopt Yaari (1987)s dual theory of choice under
uncertainty where risk aversion does not require decreasing marginal utility
of income, but is translated into a transformation of probabilities. This
formulation, where attitudes towards risk and wealth are separated, allows
us to obtain insights that could hardly be obtained with the expected utility
model. However, there are two distinct features of this model compared to
De Donder and Hindriks (2003). First, we depart from the Downsian median
voter approach. Second, distortionary nancing of social insurance generates
interior preferences for social insurance and thus the need for topping up
with private insurance.
A nice feature of our model is that the multi-dimensional types can be ag-
gregated into a single dimensional type function which reects di¤erences in
both income and risks. Hence individuals with di¤erent income and risk may
have the same preference over social insurance. Using this type aggregator
will prove useful to analyze voting outcomes. We then perform numerical
simulations of the political equilibrium outcome. Our main objectives are,
rst, to compare the Wittman equilibrium with other allocations, such as
the Downsian equilibrium, the Rawlsian and the utilitarian allocations and,
second, to perform a comparative statics analysis with respect to variations
in electoral uncertainty, distortions in taxation and the distribution of in-
come (both its skewness and its polarization).
2See e.g., Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991), Cremer and Pestieau (1996),
Gouveia (1997), and Petretto (1999).
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Our main results are as follows. With two-party competition, we obtain
policy di¤erentiation with the Left party proposing more social insurance
and attracting the support of the poorer and riskier individuals and the
Right party o¤ering less social insurance to attract the richer and safer
individuals. Parties pick a policy equidistant from the median most preferred
policy, with each party tying for winning the election. Policy choices are
strategic complements with one party o¤ering more social insurance when
the other does. This is due to the endogenous change in partiesmemberships
as policy choices change. The amount of social insurance that the parties
choose to o¤er in equilibrium depends on the whole income distribution
rather than simply on the gap between the median and mean income levels.
Increasing the skewness of the income distribution leads both parties to
o¤er more social insurance, while increasing income polarization reduces
the amount of social insurance each party will o¤er. Income polarization can
take either the form of a mean-preserving shift to the tails of the income
distribution or increased spread of the income distribution. We also compare
the political equilibrium outcome to the Rawlsian and utilitarian outcomes.
We nd that both parties always propose less social insurance than the
Rawlsian level. The utilitarian outcome di¤ers in general from the expected
endogenous Wittman equilibrium outcome. When risks and income are
not correlated, with a uniform distribution of risks and a positively skewed
distribution of income, we obtain that the expected endogenous Wittman
equilibrium rate is larger than the utilitarian level.
Finally, we provide a simple calibration of our model to U.S. data on
health insurance and compute the equilibrium position of each political
party.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model.
Section 3 describes the individual preferences for social insurance given the
possibility of topping up with private insurance. Section 4 presents the
political competition model and the equilibrium concept. Section 5 contains
the results. We calibrate the model to US data on health insurance in an
appendix.
2 The model
We describe briey the economic model which is adapted from De Donder
and Hindriks (2003) to allow for distortionary nancing of social insurance.
There is a continuum of individuals who di¤er in income w 2 [w; w] and risk
 2 [; ] continuously distributed according to a joint distribution function
H(w; ); with the frequency distribution denoted by h(w; ). The mar-
ginal distribution of risks in the population is denoted by F (), with mean
 =
R 
 dF () and median m = F
 1(1=2). The risk is the probability of
incurring a damage of xed value (normalized to one). Income levels are
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distributed according to the marginal distribution function G(w) with mean
w =
R w
w wdG(w) and median wm = G
 1(1=2).
Individual choice under risk is dual to the expected utility theory in
the sense that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities (see
Yaari, 1987). We use this formulation to separate attitude towards risk from
attitude towards wealth and to circumvent the problem that redistribution
of income through social insurance would inuence the demand for private
insurance. With the dual theory, utility is linear in income and risk aversion
translates into a transformation of probabilities that puts extra weight on
bad outcomes and less weight on good outcomes. The insurance contracts
consist of a premium  and a coverage rate  2 [0; 1] which is the proportion
of the xed damage reimbursed. More precisely, the utility derived by an
individual of type (w; ) from an insurance contract (; ) is
u(; ; w; ) = w      (1 + )(1  ) (1)
where   0 is a risk aversion parameter. In words, the individual over-
estimates by a factor  the probability of the bad event occurring, which
translates into the higher weight (1+) put on the residual damage (1 ).
There are two sorts of insurance. The compulsory social insurance o¤ers
coverage  and is nanced through proportional income taxation, with the
tax rate  2 [0; 1] set to equate tax revenue to expected social insurance
payout. However, taxation is distortionary with a deadweight loss that is
approximately a quadratic function of the tax rate. Alternatively, with a
quadratic distortion, increasing the social insurance coverage rate requires
to raise more than proportionally the tax rate. In fact the tax rate can be
written as a quadratic function of the social insurance rate. Letting   0
denote the deadweight loss parameter from taxation, the tax rate  solves
w =  + 
2 (2)
= (1 + ) 
Thus for  = 0, as in De Donder and Hindriks (2003), there is no distor-
tion and the tax rate is proportional to expected payout.
Individuals can supplement social insurance with private insurance. In-
dividual risks are private information, and insurance rms only observe the
marginal distribution F (): Faced with this adverse selection problem, rms
separate risk types by o¤ering di¤erent coverage rates at di¤erent prices.
Perfect competition ensures zero expected prots with actuarially fair-priced
insurance. Formally, if  is the social insurance coverage and () (with
0  ()  1) is the total coverage for type , then the extra private cover-
age ()     0 is purchased at the fair price  and satises the standard
incentive compatibility constraints. In that case, the utility obtained by
type (w; ) with the social insurance rate  and tax rate  is
v(; w; ) = (1  )w   (()  )  (1 + )(1  ()); (3)
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where  is given by (2) and where 1   ()  0 denotes the residual risk.
The necessary local incentive compatibility (IC) constraint implies that no
type  can benet from claiming to be of a di¤erent arbitrarily close type b:
That is, 
@v(; w; )
@^

^!
= 0()  (()  ) = 0 8 (4)
The reader can check from Mailath (1987) that the function (3) implies
that the local IC constraints (4) are not only necessary but also su¢ cient to
characterize the separating equilibrium coverage rate (). Solving (4), we
obtain
0() =
()

  

8;
which, together with the optimality condition () = 1; gives the unique
solution
()   = (1  )(=)1=: (5)
Equation (5) shows that, whatever the social insurance coverage rate  < 1,
all individuals except  are o¤ered less than full coverage. This is due to
the adverse selection on the private market. More precisely, the rst best
solution where all individuals buy full coverage on the private market at
their own actuarially fair price cannot be an equilibrium, because high risk
(and thus high price) individuals would rather buy the contracts intended
for low risk (and low price) agents. To induce each buyer to separate and
buy the contract designed for him, private insurers decrease the coverage
rate aimed at lower risk individuals. By doing so, they prevent high risk
individuals from buying the cheaper contracts designed for lower risk agents.
Equation (5) also shows that total coverage increases with social insurance
coverage, @()=@ > 0 (except of course for the highest risk  =  who
gets full coverage in equilibrium). In other words, social insurance does not
fully crowd out private insurance. The reason for this result is that, with
adverse selection, the pooling social insurance cross-subsidizes risk levels and
relaxes incentive constraints on the private insurance market. Observe also
that private insurance is not a¤ected in equilibrium by the tax distortion
from the social insurance system. This is due to the absence of income e¤ect
in the demand for insurance with the dual theory of choice under risk.
Using (5) and (3), we obtain the indirect utility function
v(; w; ) = (1  )w   (1  )(=)1=
 (1 + )(1  (1  )(=)1=   ) (6)
= (1  )w   (1  ) (1 + '(; )) 
where
'(; )  (1  (=)1=)  0 (7)
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is the e¢ ciency gain from social insurance for type  as measured by the
extra coverage evaluated by the risk aversion parameter  > 0.
3 Type aggregator and policy preferences
To understand how citizens vote over social insurance, we rst show that
the two dimensions of individual preferences (i.e., income and risk) can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type.
Di¤erentiating the payo¤ function (6) with respect to  while making
use of (2), we get
@v(; w; )
@
=  (1 + '(; ))  w(1 + 2)=w
and @2v(; w; )=@2 < 0 for  > 0; so that the payo¤ function is concave
with respect to  for all (w; ). With  = 0, we have linear preferences over
 as in De Donder and Hindriks (2003). Dene
t(w; ) = (1 + '(; ))

w
: (8)
We refer to this function as a type aggregator which is decreasing in w and
increasing in . Low-types t include rich and low risk individuals whereas
high-types t are comprised of poor and high risk individuals. Using this type
aggregator t and slightly abusing notation, we have
@v(; t(w; ))
@
= [t(w; )  (1 + 2) 
w
]w
Let t  =w and t  (1 + 2)t, then the most-preferred social insurance
rate of type t(w; ) is given by
(t(w; )) =
8><>:
0 for t(w; )  t
w=
2
h
t(w; )  w
i
for t < t(w; ) < t
1 for t(w; )  t
(9)
Individual preference over social insurance depends on own income and risk
relative to the average in the economy. The utility function is everywhere
decreasing on  2 [0; 1] for low-t individuals with t(w; )  t; everywhere
increasing for high-t individuals with t(w; )  t and exhibits an interior
maximum for other individuals with utility symmetry around the maxi-
mum. Moreover, for interior preferences, the preferred social insurance rate
is increasing with t; so individuals can be put in a transitive order. This is
due to the fact that those with higher t benet more from social insurance,
since with high risk they pay less than the fair price and with lower income
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they pay less than the average income. Note that higher risk aversion in-
creases the e¢ ciency gain from social insurance, which increases t and shifts
up the demand for social insurance of everybody. Conversely, the distortion
parameter  is scaling down the demand for social insurance of everybody.
Note also that t = t when  = 0 leading to (t(w; )) = f0; 1g: individu-
als have corner preferences when there is no distortion. Figure 1 illustrates
the aggregation of income and risk into the single dimensional type to re-
ect voterspreferences over social insurance. Figure 1 has been drawn for
a uniform distribution of income on [0; w] and a uniform distribution of risk
on

0; 

with  > 0 so that t(w; ) = t and the median type tm satises
t < tm < t.
[insert gure 1]
It will prove helpful later on to determine how voters partition themselves
when they are given the choice between two social insurance rates, L and R
with L 6= R. This partition is given by the critical type t who is indi¤erent
between L and R; that is
t(L; R) =

w
(1 + (L + R)): (10)
Without loss of generality suppose that L > R, then single-peakedness
of the utility function implies that all those with type t(w; ) > t(L; R)
prefer L while those with type t(w; ) < t(L; R) prefer R. The threshold
type is increasing in both L and R.
By the median voter theorem, the Condorcet winner (denoted by m) is
the social insurance rate preferred by the individuals with the median type,
tm. This coverage rate is the equilibrium of a Downsian electoral competition
game between two political parties only interested in winning the elections.
We now turn to the description of the non-Downsian political competition
model we use.
4 Wittman political competition
We consider two political parties (say L and R) competing for votes in an
election. Parties simultaneously choose a social insurance rate as their policy
choice. The party with most votes wins the election and is committed to
implement its policy. With two parties, there is no incentive for strategic
voting: each citizen votes for the party proposing the policy closer to her
most-preferred policy. Political parties are non-Downsian in the sense that
they care about the policy preference of their constituency (dened as the
set of citizens who vote for them).
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Without electoral uncertainty, the assumption that parties are policy
motivated does not change the convergence result to the Condorcet winner
found in Downs model. This is due to the fact that, to have any impact
on the implemented policy, a party must win the election and thus propose
the Condorcet winner (if it exists), regardless of its policy preferences (see
Roemer, 2001). To allow parties to e¤ectively express their policy prefer-
ences, we introduce uncertainty in the electoral process. This uncertainty,
together with policy-motivated parties, gives rise to the following trade-o¤:
by departing from the Condorcet winner, a party decreases its chances of
being elected but brings its policy closer to what its members prefer.
We denote by p(L; R) the proportion of individuals preferring L to
R. Assuming that L > R, and using (10), we obtain that
p(L; R) =
Z
t(w;)t(L;R)
dH(w; );
We assume that this proportion does not translate into the exact same pro-
portion of votes, because at the time of proposing their policy, parties ignore
which citizens will show up at the voting booth. More precisely, we use the
error-distribution model of uncertaintyproposed by Roemer (2001), where
both parties believe that the proportion of votes e¤ectively cast in favor of
L belongs to the interval p(L; R)  for some  > 0 and is distributed
uniformly on this interval. Thus, the probability that L defeats R is
q(L; R) =
8><>:
0 if p(L; R) +   1=2
p(L;R)+ 1=2
2 otherwise
1 if p(L; R)   1=2
The probability that L defeats R is a continuous function of the policy
pair. Party L defeats party R with probability q(L; R) and is defeated by
party R with probability r(L; R) = 1  q(L; R).
We assume as in Roemer(2001) that parties maximize the utility of their
constituents. The introduction of electoral uncertainty means that voters
evaluate lotteries  i.e., the prospect of getting policy L with probability
q(L; R) and policy R with probability r(L; R). Parties, who represent
voters, use the same dual preferences as their members to evaluate this
lottery  i.e., they overweight the probability of the bad event occurring.
Since party members by denition prefer the policy proposed by their party
to the policy proposed by the other party, each partys members overweigh
its probability of losing the elections. We assume that they overweigh the
probability of losing the election by the risk aversion parameter p > 0.
Note that the electoral probability transformation is distinct from the other
probability transformation on the insurance market. We thus have a distinct
risk aversion parameter, p, on the political market which need not take the
same value as the risk aversion parameter , on the insurance market.
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An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium is a policy pair such that
each party is maximizing the average utility of its members and parties
memberships are optimal given these policy choices. Formally,
Denition 1 An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE) is a
pair (L; R) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] such that
L = argmax (1 + p)r(
L; R)V L(R) +

1  (1 + p)r(L; R)

V L(L);
R = argmax (1 + p)q(
L; R)V R(L) +

1  (1 + p)q(L; R)

V R(R);
with the utility function of each party
V L() =
Z
t(w;)t(L;R)
v(; t(w; )) dH(w; );
V R() =
Z
t(w;)<t(L;R)
v(; t(w; )) dH(w; )
where the threshold type t(L; R) is given by equation (10).
The rst-order conditions for a Wittman equilibrium policy pair (L; R)
are
1  (1 + p)r(L; R)
 @V L(L)
@L
  [V L(L)  V L(R)](1 + p)@r(
L; R)
@L
= 0;

1  (1 + p)q(L; R)
 @V R(R)
@R
  [V R(R)  V R(L)](1 + p)@q(
L; R)
@R
= 0:
The marginal e¤ect of a change in the coverage rate proposed by one party
is twofold. First, it has a direct e¤ect on the utility of the partys members
(for a xed membership). Second, it changes the probability of winning the
election. The direct impact is given by the rst term and measures variations
in the utility of the partys members while maintaining the probability of
winning constant. The indirect impact is measured by the second term,
where the increase in utility from having ones party policy implemented
rather than the others is multiplied by the variation in the probability
of winning. Both parties will then compromise between increasing their
probability of winning the election and adopting a policy closer to what
their members prefer, which will prevent them from proposing the Condorcet
winning option.
5 Results
We are now in a position to compute the Wittman equilibria. The rst-order
conditions are too complex to obtain analytical results, so we will resort to
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numerical results. We take as the benchmark the case where the political
(p) and the economic () risk aversion parameters are both equal to 0:1.
Table 1 reports the Wittman equilibria when w and  are independently and
uniformly distributed, with support [0,2/3] for  and [0,4] for w: Results are
given for three levels of the distortion parameter  2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5g and
uncertainty  2 f0:001; 0:01; 0:03g : For each conguration of parameters,
the table reports the Wittman equilibrium policy pair (L; R), and the
median voter outcome, m = (tm).
Table 1: Equilibrium with uniformly and independently distributed income
and risk:
  L R m = 
U
0.1 0.03 65.81% 17.55%
0.01 50.39% 33.09% 41.68%
0.001 42.55% 40.78%
0.3 0.03 21.93% 5.85%
0.01 16.80% 11.03% 13.89%
0.001 14.18% 13.59%
0.5 0.03 13.17% 3.51%
0.01 10.08% 6.62% 8.34%
0.001 8.51% 8.16%
The Wittman equilibrium outcome involves policy di¤erentiation. The
larger the value of , the greater the electoral uncertainty and the more
di¤erentiated the equilibrium policies. Intuitively, more uncertainty means
that it is less electorally costly for the parties to depart from the Condorcet
winner by moving closer to their memberspreferred policy. For any  > 0,
the equilibrium policy pair satises L > m > R with party L representing
poor/high risk voters who want higher coverage and party R representing
rich/low risk voters who want lower coverage. Conversely, the equilibrium
policy of either party converges to the median voter outcome, m, as the
electoral uncertainty tends to zero. Unsurprisingly, both parties propose
less coverage in equilibrium as the degree of distortion  of social insurance
increases, since everyone then wants less social insurance. Finally, increas-
ing political risk aversion3 also reduces policy di¤erentiation because voters
dislike the uncertain policy outcome, which forces both parties to get closer
to the median voter outcome.
In equilibrium, parties propose policies that are equidistant from the me-
dian voting outcome. Given that voterspreferences over  are symmetric,
the voter who is indi¤erent between the two proposed policies is in fact the
median voter, which in turn implies that both parties have the same prob-
ability of winning the election, with each partys membership comprising
3The results with di¤erent values of p are available upon request from the authors.
See also the Annex for the impact of modifying p on a calibrated version of this model.
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exactly one half of the population. Moreover, with the proposed policies
equidistant from the median outcome, and with each party having a 50%
chance of winning the election, the expected policy is equal to the median
voting outcome.
Although this symmetry in the results is clearly linked to the symmetry
of individual preferences, it does not depend on the symmetry in the dis-
tribution of types.4 Table 2 presents the EPWE when the distribution of
income5 is positively skewed, producing equilibrium policy choices that are
also equidistant from the median voting outcome as in Table 1. Comparing
with Table 1, we see that the positive skewness of the income distribution
induces both parties to propose more social insurance in equilibrium. The
intuition for this result is that increasing the positive skewness of the income
distribution increases the proportion of people beneting from the income
redistribution associated with social insurance.
Table 2: Equilibrium with positively skewed income distribution and
uniformly distributed risk
  L R m 
U
0.1 0.03 82.17% 27.19%
0.01 64.65% 44.84% 54.68% 41.68%
0.001 55.68% 53.65%
0.3 0.03 27.4% 9.06%
0.01 21.55% 14.95% 18.23% 13.89%
0.001 18.56% 17.88%
0.5 0.03 16.44% 5.44%
0.01 12.93% 8.97% 10.94% 8.34%
0.001 11.14% 10.73%
Moreover, the equilibrium outcome depends on the whole distribution of
income and risks, and not only on the average and median values as with the
median voter outcome. Table 3 reports results for the cases where risks are
uniformly distributed as in Table 1, but where income is distributed accord-
ing to a Beta(2,2) distribution. This distribution has the same average and
median income as the uniform distribution in Table 1, but is less polarized
in the sense that the probability mass at the tails is shifted to the center.
Table 3 suggests that when the income distribution becomes less dis-
persed, both parties propose higher insurance coverage.6 This result may
4Roemer(2001, Example 3.2) exhibits the same symmetry of Wittman equilibria, but
in a simpler model in which each party maximizes the utility of an exogenously chosen
representative member. This symmetry also holds for any distribution of types in his
model.
5Table 2 gives results with a Beta(2,5) distribution of income over [0,4], with risks
independently and uniformly distributed over [0,2/3].
6This result is robust to several mean-preserving spreads of the income distribution.
We obtain similar results for all symmetric Beta(x; x) distributions of income with x > 1
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strike as bizarre since a less dispersed income distribution reduces the frac-
tion of both poor and rich voters, who have strictly opposite preferences. As
already noted, each voters preference over social insurance depends only on
her own income and risk relative to the mean values, so that it is una¤ected
by mean-preserving changes of the income and risk distribution. However
the type distribution and in particular the median type will change. Com-
parison of Table 1 and 3 shows that the median preference m increases as
the income distribution becomes less polarized.
Table 3: Equilibrium with symmetric and unimodal income distribution
and uniformly distributed risk
  L R m 
U
0.1 0.03 69.16% 22.7%
0.01 54.21% 37.67% 45.93% 41.68%
0.001 46.77% 45.07%
0.3 0.03 23.05% 7.57%
0.01 18.08% 12.56% 15.31% 13.89%
0.001 15.59% 15.03%
0.5 0.03 13.84% 4.54%
0.01 10.84% 7.54% 9.19% 8.34%
0.001 9.35% 9.02%
Figure 1 is useful to understand the reason for this result. Consider that
income polarization is reduced by a mean-preserving reduction in the income
spread (removing the richest and the poorest individuals from the uniform
income distribution). It is clear from Figure 1 that all richest individuals
are below median type while not all the poorest individuals are above the
median type. This asymmetry implies that the median type will increase as
we remove the richest and the poorest individuals from the population. This
shifts up the equilibrium policy choices of both parties. When the reduced
dispersion of income takes the form of a shifting of probability mass from the
extremes to the centre (as between Tables 1 and 3), then the distribution
of preferences within each party will change with a shift of the center of
gravity towards the median voter outcome. At the same time the median
type will increase following the same argument as for the reduction of the
income spread.
Figure 2 shows the partiesreaction functions (L(R) and R(L)), and
how they are a¤ected when the income distribution becomes less polarized.
We nd that reduced income polarization shifts both reaction functions out-
ward, which leads both parties to propose a higher coverage in equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the partiess reaction curves display strategic com-
plementarity. Indeed, xing L; an increase in R (with R < L) will induce
(we report results only for the distribution Beta(2,2) in Table 3), and also for the uniform
distribution with mean-preserving changes of the income spread, as suggested by a referee.
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(border) members of party L; who want less social insurance, to switch to
party R. In response, party L will now support more social insurance. Hence
the driving force of the strategic complementarity in the political competi-
tion game is the endogenous memberships.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Finally, we compare the EPWE coverage rates with their Rawlsian and
utilitarian levels. The Rawlsian social coverage rate maximizes the welfare
of the worst-o¤ individual, who is clearly the one with the lowest income w
and the highest risk . That is Rawls = (t(w; )). Since the demand for
social insurance decreases with income and increases with risk, the worst-o¤
individual will demand higher coverage than anyone else in either party, so
we have that Rawls > L > m > R: Moreover, we obtain from equation
(9) that the Rawlsian outcome is
Rawls =
(
1
2
h


w
w   1
i
for t(w; ) < t
1 for t(w; )  t
(11)
Observe that t(w; ) = =w because the highest risk gets e¢ cient insurance
on the private market so '(; ) = 0. It follows that t(w; ) > t  =w and
thus Rawls > 0. Equation (11) shows that the worst-o¤ individual prefers
full social insurance if the distortion parameter  is low enough. Finally,
note that if the lowest income is small enough, as in our simulations above,
then t(w; ) > t and the Rawlsian criterion calls for full social insurance
since the poorest individual does not contribute much to the nancing of
social insurance.
We now turn to the utilitarian outcome. The utilitarian planner maxi-
mizes the average utility in the population,
W () =
Z w
w
Z 

v(; w; )h(w; )dwd;
where v(; w; ) is given by equation (6). The rst-order condition is
@W ()
@
=  (1 + 2) + E [(1 + '(; )] ;
where E [:] denotes the expectation operator. The utilitarian coverage is
given by
U =
1
2

E ['(; )]


: (12)
Therefore the utilitarian coverage is independent of the income distrib-
ution. The reason is that, with the dual approach of choice under risk, the
utility function is linear in income and so all individuals exhibit the same
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marginal utility of income. The utilitarian government has no income redis-
tribution motive, and its optimal policy choice trades o¤ the e¢ ciency gain
from social insurance against the distortion cost.
A corollary to this result is that modifying the income distribution with-
out changing the distribution of risks will not change the utilitarian outcome.
Tables 1 to 3 display the same utilitarian social insurance rates, which are
reported in the last column. On the other hand, such a change in the income
distribution will denitely a¤ect the EPWE coverage rate, as can be seen
by comparing the results in Tables 1 to 3. We now compare the utilitarian
outcome (12) with the median voter outcome m. Both are equivalent if and
only if
E [(1 + '(; )]
w
= Med

(1 + '(; ))
w

;
where Med[:] denotes the median operator. It is clear that, in general,
this condition does not hold and so m 6= U . However the condition is
satised in the special case considered in Table 1 where income and risks
are independently and uniformly distributed. The values of m reported in
Table 1 thus correspond to the utilitarian social rates. This is not the case
anymore when w is not uniformly distributed, as in Tables 2 and 3. We
rather obtain in these two cases that m > U  i.e., that the expected
Wittman social coverage exceeds the utilitarian coverage.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the political support for social insurance
when individuals can buy additional insurance on the private market. Social
insurance is nanced by a distortionary income tax and redistributes across
income and risk levels. Private insurance is impaired by adverse selection,
which translates into suboptimal coverage rates. Using the dual theory of
choice under risk, we have shown that the multi-dimensional types can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type function reecting income and risk
di¤erences. Individuals can then be ranked into a transitive order according
to this type aggregator. Those with lower income and higher risk prefer more
social insurance.
The political equilibrium model we have used di¤ers from the classi-
cal Downsian one. We assume that political parties care about policy as
well as about winning election, and that elections are inherently uncertain.
When choosing their platforms, parties take into account both the utility
their members would get from their proposition in case they win and the
probability of winning the elections with this platform. We model party
preferences as endogenous, with the requirement that, at equilibrium, each
party maximizes the utility of its members, and each individual chooses
freely her party membership based on what policies parties o¤er.
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We calculate the endogenous parties Wittman equilibrium for di¤erent
parameters values and obtain the following results. We rst show that more
electoral uncertainty and less risk aversion lead to more policy di¤erentia-
tion. If electoral uncertainty is not too high, equilibrium platforms are both
interior and the equilibrium is symmetrically distributed around the median
voter outcome. In that case, the median type is indi¤erent between the par-
tiesproposals, each party ties for winning and the expected implemented
policy is the Condorcet winner. This symmetry does not depend on the
symmetry of the income distribution function, since it carries over to posi-
tively skewed distributions. Increasing the (positive) skewness of the income
distribution leads both parties to propose more social insurance. The equi-
librium policy choices depend on the whole income distribution and not only
on the median and mean values as in the Downsian model. A less polarized
income distribution also increases the equilibrium social insurance rates. Fi-
nally, we compare the political equilibrium outcome with the Rawlsian and
utilitarian outcomes. The Rawlsian criterion always calls for a larger social
insurance rate than what any political party would propose in equilibrium.
The utilitarian outcome can recommend either more or less social insurance
than the political equilibrium outcome.
To conclude we think that the endogenous Wittman equilibrium deserves
further analysis. We provide in the appendix a rst try at calibrating this
model with real data, using U.S. data from the PSID survey. Obviously,
much remains to be done empirically. We hope this paper convinces readers
that the Wittman model should be tested in many more economic situations
to check whether it provides a good representation of the political outcome.
To paraphrase Roemer (2005), We can learn a good deal from simulation,
and this allows us to work with models in which both the economic and
political sides are reasonably complex. These methods have, thus far, barely
been touched in political economy, but I expect them to come into their
own in the coming years. It would be especially interesting to extend the
Wittman equilibrium concept to more than two parties.
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Appendix : Model calibration
We rst describe how we have used data from the Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID) to gather information on income levels and health
expenditures for a sample of 6863 households. We then calibrate our model
to calculate the Wittman equilibrium.
A.1. Distribution of risk and income
To calibrate our model, we need information on both income and risk
distributions. The unit of observation is the household. As a measure of
income, we use the 1998 total family income as reported in the 1999 Income
plusPSID data base (variable Faminc99). This variable measures the sum
of taxable income of head and wife, transfer income of head and wife, tax-
able and transfer incomes of other family unit members, and social security
income. Among respondents to this question, the average family income is
$52,200 and the median income is $38,300.
As for risks, we concentrate on medical care costs. We rst gather
information on medical care costs incurred by these families in 1999 and
2000. These costs are obtained from the 2001 Core family data (vari-
able ER19860) and consist of out-of-pocket costs plus the costs covered by
Medicare, Medicaid, or other health insurance. The events covered are hos-
pital and nursing home stays, doctor and clinic visits, outpatient surgery,
dental visits, prescriptions, and in-home medical care. We obtain the fol-
lowing distribution of medical care costs.
Table 4: Distribution of medical care costs in 1999 and 2000
less than 1,000 $ 15.60%
1,000-5,000 $ 31.00%
5,000-25,000$ 34.60%
25,000-100,000$ 9.45%
100,000-500,000$ 1.50%
more than 500,000$ 0.25%
no response 7.60%
We keep in our database the 6863 households who have answered both
questions (on income and health costs). We are not directly interested in
the health costs, but in the risk to incur such costs. Our model uses a binary
description of events (damage or no damage) while the PSID gives us some
information on the size of the damage. To calibrate our model, we consider
that a damage occurs if household medical care costs in 1999 and 2000 are
greater than a threshold. We consider two distinct thresholds: 5,000 $ and
25,000$. For the low threshold, 45.8% of households have incurred a damage,
and this proportion is 11.2% for the high threshold.
We know each households 1998 income and whether it has incurred a
damage in 1999 and 2000. We then translate this binary information into a
probability in 1998 to incur the damage in the following years. We compute,
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for each percentile of the income distribution, the proportion of households
incurring the damage. This proportion is then used as the proxy for the risk
probability of all households in this income group. The joint distribution
of risk and income we obtain exhibits a correlation between income and risk
of -0.10 for the low cost denition and 0.08 for the high one.
A.2. Political equilibrium
Given the discrete distribution of risk and income we cannot use the
rst-order approach to calculate the Wittman equilibria. We briey explain
the algorithm used before reporting our results.
We exploit the feature of the symmetric equilibrium in which both parties
pick a policy equidistant from the population median.7 Formally, for each
coverage rate L proposed by the Left party we calculate the coverage rate
m(L) for the Right party that makes the median voter indi¤erent. The
function m(L) solves
v(L; tm) = v(m(
L); tm)
where tm is the median type. Thus we have
m(L)  m  L;
where m denotes the policy most favored by the median type (i.e., the
Condorcet winner). We then use the following algorithm: (1) Start with
L = m + " for " > 0 small: (2) Compute R = m(L): (3) Verify that the
left party has no incentive to deviate. That is, study small deviations around
L and compute the impact on the probability of winning the elections and
on the average utility of its members. If all small deviations around L have
e¤ects of opposite signs on the winning probability and on the memberships
utility, the EPWE has been found8 and the procedure stops. If not, we
increase slightly the value of L and go back to (2).
Using this algorithm, we have calculated the equilibrium policy pair for
di¤erent values of the parameters. Table 4 summarizes the results we obtain
with the two denitions of the damage and with two values for the political
risk aversion parameter p.
We obtain intuitively that the equilibrium outcome moves closer to the
Condorcet winner as political risk aversion increases. Comparing the results
obtained with the two denitions of the damage, we see that the Condorcet
winning coverage rate decreases when the damage is high, but the policy
proposed by the left party actually increases! This is due to the di¤ering
risks distribution when one moves from one denition of the damage to the
other.
7Equivalently this means that at equilibrium party Ls membership is composed of all
types lower than the median type and party R of all types above the median. Hence, each
party has a 50% chance of winning the elections at equilibrium.
8We check that, if party L has no incentive to deviate, this is also the case for party
R.
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Table 5: EPWE with PSID data (with  = 0:05,  = 0:4; = 0:1)
p 
L R m = E(
L; R)
Low damage
0 56.7% 39.3% 48%
0.05 55.9% 40.1% 48%
High damage
0 62.8% 12.4% 37.6%
0.05 60.8% 14.4% 37.6%
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